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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)' has caused considerable
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School 2005. A.B., with high distinc-
tion, University of Michigan 2002. The author would like thank Professor Robert Howse out
of whose class this Note developed, Jay Surdukowski, Aaron Ostrovsky, Rabeha Kamaluddin,
and Julia Sutherland for their helpful comments. A special thank you to the author's family for
their constant support and understanding. All errors belong solely to the author.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) (TRIPs Agreement).
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debate since its formal adoption in the Uruguay Round of 1994 as schol-
ars try to understand its text and legal implications.2 Not surprisingly,
like many other WTO agreements, TRIPs is a compromise between
countries with countervailing interests and therefore, is very disjunc-
tive--containing many seemingly contradictory standards Such
disjunction makes the relationship between various parts of the treaty
difficult to understand and creates many separate balancing tests within
the agreement itself.4 Its purposefully vague language has formalized
some aspects of intellectual property rights, but has also created ques-
tions in many other areas.' Section 5 Patents is an epicenter for the
academic debates arising from TRIPs, especially in the realm of pharma-
ceutical products.6 The breadth of scope and coverage of Section 5 in
addressing the issues and conflicts of both developed and non-developed
states has made TRIPs "the most important multilateral instrument in
this field*"7
Article 27 has probably been the greatest source of controversy be-
tween developed and non-developed Members arising out of the TRIPs
Agreement, especially regarding the availability of generic medicines to
combat AIDS and other medical crises.8 One debate arising from the ne-
gotiated language of Article 27 is the purported implications of its broad
non-discrimination clause. 9 The interaction between Articles 27, 28, 30,
and 31 holds the answer to which intellectual property rights a govern-
ment must enforce and those it can forego in the pursuit of government
policies that will most benefit its people.' ° These policies include every-
2. Zhang Naigen, Dispute Settlement Under the TRIPS Agreement from the Perspec-
tive of Treaty Interpretation, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 199, 200 (2003) (stating that as of
2003 "more than twenty disputes have arisen under the TRIPs Agreement since it was entered
into force on January 1, 1995").
3. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips e/pharma-atol86_e.htm (TRIPs
Technical Note) explaining that balancing the many different and often opposite interests of
the Member States is very difficult.
4. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, PHILOSOPHY: TRIPS ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE A BAL-
ANCE, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/trips-e/factsheet-pharm00_e.html (TRIPs Fact
Sheet).
5. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 50 (2000).
6. Erin K. Bender, North and South: The WTO, TRIPS, and the Scourge of Biopiracy,
11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 281, 309 (2003).
7. DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS,
220 (1998).
8. Bender, supra note 6, at 311.
9. Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO
TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patents Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,
368 (2002).
10. IAN MCTAGGERT SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON LAW OF TREATIES 127
(2D ED. 1984) "The text of a treaty must be read as a whole. One cannot simply concentrate on
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thing from economic growth" to the compulsory licensing of medicines
used to stem a health crisis.'2 In Canada-Patent Protection of Pharma-
ceutical Products (Canada-Generic Medicines), the Panel found that
the non-discrimination clause in Article 27 applied to exceptions granted
under Articles 30 and 31.'3 Many scholars disagree with the Panel's deci-
sion because they believe that applying the non-discrimination clause to
Articles 30 and 31 will unfairly limit the ability of governments to pur-
sue the policies they find most fit for their people and that such a
limitation would be most detrimental to least developed and developing
countries, forcing them to fall further behind in the technological realm,
particularly in the ability to provide essential medicines at a reduced
price." This scholarly group argues in various ways that Articles 30 and
31 provide total exceptions to the Section 5, allowing States to deny pat-
ent rights and avoid possible conflicts with the Article 27 non-
discrimination clause.'
This Note argues that the Panel in Canada-Generic Medicines cor-
rectly decided that the non-discrimination clause in Article 27 applies to
the exceptions of Articles 30 and 31. Because Article 27 is the guiding
force of Section 5, any exceptions to the rights granted under Section 5
must comply with the requirements set forth in Article 27.16 Although
extreme applications of the non-discrimination clause could be limiting
upon some exceptions, Articles 30 and 31 were not placed into TRIPs as
complete escape clauses from the framework of Section 5. '7 Additionally,
the application of the non-discrimination clause to Articles 30 and 31 are
not necessarily as limiting as some scholars fear-the negotiated text
provides a number of methods Members can use to alleviate most con-
18straints.
Part II of this Note provides an introduction to the TRIPs Agreement
and lays out the interpretation standard used. Part III discusses the
a paragraph, an article, a section, a chapter, or a part." Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 383.
("Only by reading these provisions as a whole can the meaning of Article 27(1) be deter-
mined. This more inclusive approach accords with established principles of treaty
interpretation.").
11. ROBERT L. OSTERGARD JR., THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 45 (2003).
12. Johanna Kiehl, TRIPS Article 31(B) and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 10 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 143, 143 (2002).
13. Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada--Generic Medi-
cines), Mar. 20, 2000, DSR 2000:V 2289, WTO Doc. WT/DS14/R 7.91, 7.93. See infra
Parts V(B) and VI for dissenting scholarly work.
14. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9; Bender, supra note 6.
15. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 367.
16. See infra Parts III, V, and VI.
17. See infra Part V.B.
18. See infra Parts III and V.D.
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Dispute Resolution Body's (DSB) interpretation of Articles 27 and 30 as
explained by the Panel in Canada-Generic Medicines. Part IV de-
scribes the Doha Declaration, which is the WTO's response to the
Member State's concerns regarding the availability of generic medicines,
and analyzes its practical effects on Articles 27 and 30. Part V turns to a
strict textual analysis of Articles 27, 28, and 30 and incorporates the un-
derstandings of the DSB into the text. With the necessary information
having been laid out, Part V focuses on the interaction between Articles
27 and 30. Part VI explains the interaction within the TRIPs Agreement
as a whole, the text of the Articles, the understanding of the Member
States at the time of agreement, and how the Members can avoid the
proposed limitations caused by a broad interpretation of Article 27.
H. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INSTITUTIONALIZED: TRIPs
The WTO defines intellectual property rights (IPRs) as "the rights
given to people over the creations of their minds. They usually give the
creator an exclusive right over the use of his/her creations for a certain
period of time."' 9 Patents safeguard a certain type of IPRs designed to
protect "industrial property protected primarily to stimulate innovation,
design and the creation of technology" which includes inventions, indus-
trial designs, and trade secrets. 0
Pre-TRIPs, Member States maintained widely varying levels of IPR
protection and enforcement to protect their divergent "goals, values, his-
tory, culture, tradition and political climate .. ,21 The pre-TRIPs system
led some countries to provide very little protection. Most international
IPR protection was derived from a number of bi-lateral and multi-lateral
trade agreements." This arrangement led to many differences in the way
countries protected IPRs and did not provide for a binding enforcement• 24
mechanism. The United States and other developed countries sought a
more uniform and institutionalized system of IPRs to ensure maximum
protection for their products, predictability of local market rules, and a
19. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/pharma-atol86_e.htm (TRIPs
FAQs).
20. Id.
21. Donald P. Harris, TRIPS' Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS
Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 99, 104
(2004).
22. Id.
23. Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Devel-
oping World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 211, 215-17 (2004).
24. Id.
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central dispute settlement mechanism. 5 Developing countries were hesi-
tant to adopt a central institutionalized forum because they believed this
type of forum was most favorable to developed countries and would not
adequately consider their needs and interests.26
The final TRIPs Agreement addresses five main issues:
(1) how basic principles of the trading system and other interna-
tional intellectual property agreements should be applied;
(2) how to give adequate protection to intellectual property
rights;
(3) how countries should enforce those rights adequately in their
own territories;
(4) how to settle disputes on intellectual property between mem-
bers of the WTO;
(5) special transitional arrangements during the period when the
new system is being introduced.27
Under TRIPs, intellectual property refers to "all categories of intellectual
property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part I1.,,28 These
rights include: copyright and related rights; trademarks; geographical
indications; industrial designs; patents; layout-designs (topographies) of
integrated circuits; and protection of undisclosed information.29 In ad-
dressing those issues, TRIPs "establishes minimum levels of protection
that each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow
WTO members."3° As a minimum standards agreement, TRIPs "allows
states to give greater protection to intellectual property rights if they
choose."'" It also allows Member States to implement the Agreement in
the way they deem proper within their legal system. To establish the
25. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 320 (2nd ed. 1999); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Recon-
sidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 842-43 (2003). A coalition of
forty countries supported TRIPs and ensured its adoption by the Ministerial Conference in
Punta del Este.
26. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 373.
27. World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif-e/agrm7-e.htm (hereinafter IP Protection
and Enforcement).
28. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1.2.
29. Id. §§ 1-7.
30. IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 27.
31. Muria Kruger, Harmonizing TRIPs and the CBD: A Proposal from India, 10 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 169, 179 (2001).
32. TRIPs FAQs, supra note 19; see also Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 5(b)(Doha Declaration). The
Doha Declaration reaffirms several commitments of the TRIPs Agreement (discussed infra,
Spring 20051
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minimum levels, TRIPs incorporates the "substantive obligations" of
WIPO, the Paris Convention, and the Berne Convention (excluding the
moral rights in Berne) and select provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits and the Rome Convention
with "additional obligations in areas which were not addressed in these
conventions, or were thought not to be sufficiently addressed in them."3
TRIPs establishes baseline international standards for pharmaceutical
protection and attempts to balance the short term objectives of affording
access to medicines and the long term objective of providing incentives
for the development of new medicines)'
As part of the final compromise on TRIPs, the Member States al-
lowed for an extended transitional period until January 2006 for the least
developed countries and a number of exceptions to the general rules of
the agreement, including the continued allowance of compulsory licens-
ing for patents under Article 312 5 TRIPs also established the first
centralized dispute settlement mechanism for disagreements involving
intellectual property matters by subjecting those disagreements to the
WTO's dispute settlement procedures.36 One scholar notes: "As is the
case with many international agreements negotiated by diplomats, the
agreement has both textual and operational flaws, but finally did achieve
a system of worldwide uniform intellectual property protection through
developed standards backed by the prospects of binding dispute resolu-
tion.""
Before moving forward, it is proper to explain the standard used by
the DSB when interpreting treaties and specifically TRIPs. The DSB
settles all disputes regarding the TRIPs Agreement in accordance with
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU), which means any dispute under TRIPs will involve an
examination of the consistency of a Member State's domestic intellectual
property laws with TRIPs.38 Though TRIPs does not expressly name the
Vienna Convention as the standard for interpreting its provisions, the
DSB adopted the Vienna standard in its first Report and has followed it
Part IV) including a Member State's right to implement TRIPs in a manner appropriate to its
legal system.
33. TRIPs FAQs, supra note 19.
34. Mercurio, supra note 23, at 218.
35. Doha Declaration, supra note 32 (the Doha Declaration pushed back the deadline
for least developed and developing countries to 2016); IP Protection and Enforcement, supra
note 27; TRIPs FAQs, supra note 19. Mercurio, supra note 23, at 218-19.
36. TRIPs FAQs, supra note 19.
37. Mercurio, supra note 23, at 218.
38. Naigen, supra note 2, at 201.
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since the United States-Gasoline case.39 The Vienna Convention stan-
dard is: "A treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose." To understand the meaning
of a treaty in its entirety, the parties should use the express text, includ-
ing its preamble and annexes, any agreements made by all parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty, and any instrument con-
nected to the conclusion of a treaty that is accepted by all the other
parties as an instrument of the treaty.1 Under Article 31(3) of the Vienna
Convention, any subsequent agreement, practice, or special meaning in-
tended can be used in addition to the text of the treaty to determine the
"ordinary meaning" of the terms. 42 When the meaning of a term is still
ambiguous, obscure, or "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable" after the application of Article 31, the parties may use
"supplementary means of interpretation" such as the negotiating history
to help determine the true meaning. 3 Words not present within a treaty,
however, may not be assumed or imported into it." The WTO Appellate
Body has stated that it does not "condone the imputation into a treaty of
words that are not there."45
III. CANADA-GENERIC MEDICINES: THE CURRENT DSB
INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATION
CLAUSE IN TRIPS ARTICLE 27
As previously mentioned, the Panel decision in Canada-Generic
Medicines established the current DSB interpretation of the non-
discrimination clause in Article 27. The question presented in the dispute
was whether two provisions of Canada's Patent Act were in conformity
with Canada's obligations under TRIPs.' The two disputed provisions,
Sections 55.2(1) and 55.2(2) of the Patent Act, created exceptions to the
39. Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line (United States--Gasoline), adopted May 20, 1996, as modified by the Appellate Body
Report, DSR 1996:1 29, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R; Naigen, supra note 2, at 202.
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (hereinafter Vienna Convention).
41. Id. art. 31(2).
42. Id. art. 31(3).
43. Id. art. 32.
44. Id. art. 31.
45. Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products (India-Pharmaceuticals), adopted Jan. 16, 1998, DSR 1998:19,
WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R.
46. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 7.1.
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exclusive rights of patent owners. ' 7 Section 55.2(1), known as the "regu-
latory review exception," "applies to patented products such as
pharmaceuticals whose marketing is subject to government regulation in
order to assure their safety or effectiveness., 8 The purpose of this excep-
tion is to "permit potential competitors of the patent owner to obtain
government marketing approval during the term of the patent, so that
they will have regulatory permission to sell in competition with the pat-
ent owner by the date on which the patent expires. 49 Without the
"regulatory review exception," the patent holder could maintain exclu-
sive control of the market for years beyond the cessation of its monopoly
rights because the law would otherwise prevent competitors from using
the patented product for testing purposes." This exception has a limited
scope, applying only to activities "solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information required" by any law,
Canadian or non-Canadian, that "regulates the manufacture, construc-
tion, use or sale of any product."5' According to data supplied by the
Canadian government, a pharmaceutical product patent lasts twenty
years, and of those twenty years, the drug company uses eight to twelve
years to achieve regulatory approval, leaving twelve to eight years of
actual market monopoly.52 The regulatory and development process for a
generic supplier is about three to six and one half years, meaning that if
the patent holder were allowed to block any testing or development of
the generic product until after the patent term had expired, the default
patent term would become approximately twenty-three to twenty-six and
one half years.53 Canada, by its regulatory review exception, wished to
remove the extra three to six and one half years from the process so as to
more quickly provide less expensive medicine and competition.54
Section 55.2(2), known as the "stockpiling exception," permits
"competitors to manufacture and stockpile patented goods during a cer-
tain period before the patent expires, but the goods cannot be sold until
47. Id.
48. Id. 17.2.
49. Id. The question arises whether the Canadian government is not enforcing the ex-
clusive use of the patented product when it allows a competitor to test its copied versions of
the patented product during the patent term.
50. Id.
51. Id. 7.5. Such a limitation is important because it shows that the Canadian govern-
ment would only allow competitors to take the steps necessary to compete after the patent
period was complete-which is the obligation of WTO Members, minus certain exceptions.
52. Id. 7.3.
53. See id.
54. Id. 1 7.2-7.3. The Canadian government has a strong interest to ensure that the
healthcare costs of its citizens remain as low as possible. A good way to decrease costs is to
ensure that the patents are strictly limited to the minimum standards established by TRIPs.
[Vol. 26:899
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the patent expires."55 This exception allows for an imitator company to
"make, construct, or use" a patented product during the patent term so
the company may accumulate enough product to make a significant im-
pact on the market once the patent holder's exclusive rights have run
out.56 The exception in Section 55.2 needs implementing legislation to
take effect and the Canadian government has passed such legislation for
pharmaceuticals.57 Additionally, Sections 55.2(1) and 55.2(2) are inter-
connected so that the only way a company could benefit from the
Section 55.2(2) "stockpiling exception" was by first being approved for a
"regulatory review exception" under Section 55.2(1).58 If the Canadian
government did not have both exceptions and tie them together, the ex-
ceptions would do very little independently in furtherance of their main
purpose.59 A hypothetical situation where a company would have the
ability to stockpile a large quantity of products before the expiration of
the patent term under Section 55.2(2), but not have permission to seek
regulatory approval as provided under Section 55.2(1) would not pro-
mote the government's purpose because few if any companies would be
willing to take the risk of producing a large amount of product without
knowing whether they could actually sell it.6°
The European Community (EC) brought suit alleging "that Sections
55.2(1) and 55.2(2) of Canada's Patent Act are inconsistent with Can-
ada's obligations under Articles 27.1 and 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
and, to the extent that Section 55.2(2) violates Article 28.1, it is also in-
consistent with Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement., 6' The EC claimed
that their pharmaceutical industry had lost around C$100 million per
year because of the Canadian laws.62 Beginning with its arguments
against the "stockpiling exception" under Section 55.2(2), the EC made
a number of claims. The EC's first claim was that Canada violated is
obligations under Articles 28.1 and 33 by permitting the manufacture
and stockpiling of pharmaceuticals during the six months immediately
before the expiration of the twenty year patent term.63 The EC argued
55. Id. 7.7. This is an even greater exclusive use problem since the section expressly
allows a competitor to produce the replicated product during the patent term of the patent
owner.
56. Id.
57. Id. T 7.8. Again, the Canadian government is striving to ensure that upon the expira-
tion of the twenty year patent term a generic replication would be available, and furthermore,
a company could manufacture a significant enough stock to have a substantial and continuous
impact on the market beginning on the first day after the twenty years elapse.
58. Id. T 7.10.
59. Id.
60. See id.
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that Canada violated its agreement to provide patent protection for
twenty years by allowing a company to stockpile six months early,
thereby providing only nineteen and one half years protection; anybody
was allowed to make the replicated products six months before the expi-
ration of the patent without the consent of the patent holder; and Canada
was the only country in the world that allowed for such an exception.
4
Secondly, "by treating patent holders in the field of pharmaceutical in-
ventions less favourably than inventions in all other fields of technology,
Canada infringed its obligations contained in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement."65 The EC contended that Section 55.2(2) discriminated by
field of technology because pharmaceuticals were the reason that Sec-
tion 55.2(2) passed and did not apply to any other product; and "the
Canadian legislation discriminated against pharmaceutical inventions by
treating them less favourably than inventions in all other fields of tech-
nology..."66
After discussing the "stockpiling exception," the EC explained its
objections to the "regulatory review exception" in Section 55.2(1). The
EC believed that Section 55.2(1) "allowed all activities related to the
development and submission of information required to obtain marketing
approval for pharmaceutical products carried out by a third party without
the consent of the patent holder at any time during the patent term, not-
withstanding the exclusive rights stipulated in Article 28.1 ',,67 Furthering
this argument, the EC contended that the lack of time limitation was un-
acceptable; almost all the exclusive rights of a patent owner were
removed with a very limited exception; and the interaction of Sections
55.2(1) and 55.2(2) allowed an almost unlimited violation of the exclu-
sive rights of making and using a product during the patent term.68 After
all, Section 55.2(1) allowed companies to buy and sell the patented
product without the patent holder's permission as long as it was "rea-
sonably related to the development and submission of information
required under the law of Canada, a province or a country other than
Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any
product. 69 Secondly, the EC contended that by allowing the develop-
mental and regulatory process on a copied product to proceed during the
64. Id. Articles 28 and 33 confer the exclusive rights of a patent holder. Article 33 guar-
antees that a patent term extends to twenty years from the filing date. Article 28 guarantees




68. Id. The combination of exceptions does allow a company a lot of leeway to copy
and make a product during the patent term which unquestionably is a violation of the express
requirements of Article 28.
69. Id.
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patent term "without the consent of the patent holder at any time during
the patent term, Canada treated holders of pharmaceutical patents less
favourably than holders of patents in all other fields of technology and
thus violated its obligations under Article 27. 1. ,70 They further main-
tained that even though the text of the regulation applied to all fields of
technology, in practice it only applied to pharmaceuticals. 71
A final issue addressed by the EC that is pertinent to this Note is the
application of Article 30 to this dispute.72 As discussed below, Canada
invoked Article 30 as a defense to its regulations because, as it argued,
though the exceptions might have been a violation of Article 28, its regu-
lations were narrow enough to fall under the "limited exceptions" of
Article 30.73 The EC disagreed with Canada's defense arguing that the
exceptions provided in the regulations were not "limited exceptions" and
that "a violation of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement could not be
justified under Article 30."
74
Canada disagreed with the EC's interpretation of Article 30 and
stated that the exceptions provided for in Sections 55.2(1) and 55.2(2) to
the exclusive rights of the patent holder were limited exceptions, did not
conflict with the "normal exploitation" of a patent, did not prejudice or
unreasonably prejudice the "legitimate interests" of the patentee or third
parties, and the third party interests taken into account "were 'legitimate
interests' of relevant third parties., 75 Furthering this line of reasoning,
Canada also claimed that "the prohibition in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement against discrimination on the basis of field of technology did
not apply to allowable limited exceptions. 76 Even if Article 27.1 does
apply to allowable limited exceptions, Canada claimed it "did not dis-
criminate as to the field of technology in which an invention occurred,
because they related to products that were subject to laws regulating the
manufacture, construction, use or sale of a product and were not ex-
pressly related to any particular field of technology.' 77 Canada also
denied the contention that allowing exceptions amounted to a violation








77. Id. The actual regulation did not contain a clause limiting the application of the
regulation to pharmaceuticals. However, the only product area in which the Canadian legisla-
ture had actually passed implementing legislation was pharmaceuticals. This closely reflects
the EC contention that the regulation was not discriminatory on its face, but it was discrimina-
tory in enforcement.
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did nothing to impair a patentee's right to exploit its patent for the full
term of protection by working the patent for its private commercial ad-
vantage.'78 Interestingly, "Canada acknowledged that the provisions of
Section 55.2(2) permitting third parties to 'make,' 'construct,' or 'use' the
patented product during the term of the patent, without the patent
owner's permission, would be a violation of Article 28.1 if not excused
under Article 30 of the Agreement."
79
After considering the positions of the EC, Canada, and eleven third
parties, the Panel concluded that Canada's only violation was that "Sec-
tion 55.2(2) of Canada's Patent Act is not consistent with the
requirements of Article 28.1."8° The Panel then asked the Dispute Settle-
ment Body to "request that Canada bring Section 55.2(2) into
conformity with Canada's obligations under the TRIPS Agreement."8
Additionally, the Panel decided not to discuss the EC's claim that Arti-
cles 28.1 and 33 were interconnected, directly addressing only the
Article 28 violation at this time. 2 Surprisingly, despite Canada's winning
on the 55.2(1) claims, the Panel ruled against most of its legal argu-
83ments.
Most important for this Note, the Panel stated that it "was unable to
agree with Canada's contention that Article 27.1 did not apply to excep-
tions granted under Article 30. The text of the TRIPS Agreement offers
no support for such an interpretation." ' 4 The Panel further explained that:
Article 27.1 prohibits discrimination as to enjoyment of "patent
rights" without qualifying that term. Article 30 exceptions are
explicitly described as "exceptions to the exclusive rights con-
ferred by a patent" and contain no indication that any exemption
from non-discrimination rules is intended. A discriminatory ex-
ception that takes away enjoyment of a patent right is
discrimination as much as is discrimination in the basic rights
78. Id. Essentially, Canada argued that the generic drug companies were not benefiting
during the patent term because they could not sell the product until after the twenty years were
up. It is only fair to the consumer market that immediately after the twenty year patent term is
completed a competitor could actively compete. Otherwise, the patent holder would receive a
de facto three to six and one half year extension on its monopoly rent which is the average




82. Id. 7.38. The Panel did not find the need to address Article 33 questions because it
found that Section 55.2(2) did not fulfill the first requirement of Article 30 and therefore, they
did not have to address the rest of the claims.
83. Id. H 7.39-7.84. Perhaps the most significant argument that Canada lost under this
section of the opinion is the scope of Article 30's limited exceptions. These differences are
discussed under the interpretation of Article 30, infra, Parts V(B) and VI.
84. Id. 7.91.
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themselves. The acknowledged fact that the Article 31 exception
for compulsory licences and government use is understood to be
subject to the non-discrimination rule of Article 27.1, without
the need for any textual provision so providing, further strength-
ens the case for treating the non-discrimination rules as
applicable to Article 30. Articles 30 and 31 are linked together
by the opening words of Article 31 which define the scope of
Article 31 in terms of exceptions not covered by Article 30.8"
The Panel also disagreed with Canada's policy arguments that its
ability under the Patent Act to discriminate against individual patents
made its exceptions to Article 30 limited and that applying Article 27 to
Article 30 exceptions would force those exceptions to apply to all prod-
ucts. 86 First, "an Article 30 exception cannot be made 'limited' by
limiting it to one field of technology, because the effects of each excep-
tion must be found to be 'limited' when measured against each affected
patent."87 Secondly:
Article 27 prohibits only discrimination as to the place of inven-
tion, the field of technology, and whether products are imported
or produced locally. Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide ex-
ceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain
product areas. Moreover, to the extent the prohibition of dis-
crimination does limit the ability to target certain products in
dealing with certain of the important national policies referred to
in Articles 7 and 8.1, that fact may well constitute a deliberate
limitation rather than a frustration of purpose. It is quite plausi-
ble, as the EC argued, that the TRIPS Agreement would want to
require governments to apply exceptions in a non-discriminatory
manner, in order to ensure that governments do not succumb to
domestic pressures to limit exceptions to areas where right hold-
ers tend to be foreign producers.88
The Panel did not find Canada's general legal and policy arguments
regarding the interaction of Articles 27 and 30 persuasive, but it agreed
with Canada's arguments on their own alleged discrimination in finding
that Canada's statute did not violate the non-discrimination clause of
85. Id. The Panel's very textual approach to understanding the relationship between the
individual provisions of TRIPs follows closely to the rules mandated by the Vienna Conven-
tion in Article 31(1) "A treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
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Article 27.89 Section 55.2(1) engaged in neither de jure nor de facto dis-
crimination against pharmaceutical products.9° "It was not proved that
the adverse effects of Section 55.2(1) were limited to the pharmaceutical
industry, or that the objective indications of purpose demonstrated a pur-
pose to impose disadvantages on pharmaceutical patents in particular."9'
The question then becomes to what extent Article 27.1 limits the ex-
ceptions under Article 30 and Article 31. After all, at first glance, an
article that guarantees absolute non-discrimination by field of technol-
ogy could limit many exceptions into non-existence--especially
compulsory licenses. The Panel did not rule against Canada in this case
even though the Panel stated it was clear that "the primary reason for
passing the measure was its effect on promoting competition in the
pharmaceutical sector. This is also evident from Canada's justification
for the measure presented in this dispute settlement proceeding." 92 The
Panel further stated:
[P]reoccupation with the effects of a statute in one area does not
necessarily mean that the provisions applicable to other areas are
a sham, or of no actual or potential importance. Individual prob-
lems are frequently the driving force behind legislative actions
of broader scope. The broader scope of the measure usually re-
flects an important legal principle that rules being applied in the
area of primary interest should also be applied to other areas
where the same problem occurs. Indeed, it is a common desid-
eratum in many legal systems that legislation apply its
underlying principles as broadly as possible. So long as the
broader application is not a sham, the legislation cannot be con-
sidered discriminatory. In the absence of any proof that the
broader scope was a sham, it must be found that the evident con-
centration of public attention upon the effects of Section 55.2(1)





92. Id. 7.104. The language of the statute did not single out pharmaceutical patents,
but the legislators who enacted 55.2(1) clearly penned this provision in reaction to a perceived
need of less expensive pharmaceutical products.
93. Id. Section 55.2(1) does not expressly mention the pharmaceutical industry and
applies "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
required under any law [... ] that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any
product". Id. 7.95. Thus, any product that requires regulatory approval including "agricul-
tural chemicals, foodstuffs, cosmetics, automobiles, vessels and aircraft" falls within the scope
of this regulation. Id.
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The Canada-Generic Medicines Panel crafted its language very
carefully so as to avoid creating a situation in which a State would be in
violation of Article 27 if it needed to grant an Article 30 exception for a
particular product. 94 It also provided great leniency on the purposes for
which legislation may be passed and not considered discriminatory.95
The next section further illustrates the WTO's understanding of Articles
27 and 30 and its awareness of the potential problems caused by an
overly restrictive standard on the use of exceptions.
IV. THE DOHA DECLARATION: THE MEMBER STATES
EXPRESSING THEIR CONCERNS
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health
directly addressed some of the concerns of WTO Member States regard-
ing the perceived limitations caused by Section 5 on their ability to
provide adequate pharmaceuticals to their population.96 It is viewed as
the "first significant victory for developing countries in the short history
of TRIPS" and was also "a major success for the highly visible interna-
tional activist movement that has long campaigned against poor access to
pharmaceuticals in developing countries."' "The final text of the Doha
Declaration sought to 'clarify' the interpretation of TRIPs and empha-
sized the 'flexibilities' already written into the agreement, including the
right of Members to invoke those provisions when needed." 98 Paragraphs
1-3 of the Declaration recognize the concerns of both developing coun-
tries in their desire to provide medicine for their populace as well as the
94. Id. 7.92. As quoted above, the Panel expressly said that "Article 27 does not pro-
hibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product areas."
95. See id. 7.104.
96. Doha Declaration, supra note 32; Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the
TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO
Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA AND ENT. L.J. 859, 860 (2002).
97. Mercurio, supra note 23, at 212. The timing of the Doha Declaration is not coinci-
dental:
The time was ripe for developing countries to push for a shift in stance from devel-
oped countries towards access to medicines. Not only did the highly visible plight
of many poor and ravaged countries place a significant amount of pressure on de-
veloped nations to be sympathetic to the demands of developing countries and the
LDCs, but the U.S. and Canada faced the possibility of looking extremely hypo-
critical in the wake of its post-September 2001 threats [i.e. the U.S. government
threatening to issue a compulsory license against Bayer AG Corporations Cipro an-
tibiotic, which is a treatment for anthrax].
Id.
98. Id. at 225.
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desire of developed countries to provide intellectual property protection
for their corporations." Paragraph 4 declares that the Ministers:
agree that the TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accord-
ingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be in-
terpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
Member's right to protect public health and, in particular, to
promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaf-
firm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility
for this purpose.'"
Thus, "Paragraph 4 strongly reaffirms the principle that protecting
public health and promoting access to medicines is a valid basis for
Members to enact exceptions to patent protection in their domestic legis-
lation."' '°  Paragraph 5 lists "flexibilities" Members may use in
implementing TRIPs. 10 2 Paragraph 5 states:
Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, while main-
taining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize
that these flexibilities include (a) In applying the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles. (b) Each Member has the right to grant
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds
upon which such licenses are granted. (c) Each Member has the
right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that
public health crises, including those relation to HIV/AIDS, tu-
berculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. (d) The
effect of the provision in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant
99. Doha Declaration, supra note 32, 1-3; Mercurio, supra note 23, at 226. Para-
graph 1 "recognize[s] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and
least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics." Paragraph 2 "stress[es] the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider
national and international action to address these problems." Paragraph 3 "recognize[s] that
intellectual property protection is important for the development of new medicines. We also
recognize the concerns about its effects on prices." Doha Declaration, supra note 32 IT 1-3.
100. Doha Declaration, supra note 32, 4.
101. Mercurio, supra note 23, at 226.
102. Doha Declaration, supra note 32, 5; Mercurio, supra note 23, at 226-27.
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to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each
Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion
without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment
provisions of Articles 3 and 4.03
Paragraph 6 discusses the availability of compulsory licenses in
countries "with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities in the
pharmaceutical sector" and directs the Council for TRIPs to find a solu-
tion. ' 4 Paragraph 7 extends the application of TRIPs Sections 5 and 7 for
least developed countries until January 1, 2016.'05
Although the Doha Declaration called for greater flexibility in the
use of TRIPs to further the availability of medicines, the Declaration and
ensuing implementation of Paragraph 6 did not provide unrestricted us-
age of the exceptions to TRIPs.' ° The Doha Declaration does not restrict
the use of the DSB, except in challenging the exhaustion of IPRs stan-
dards of other Members, so States may still enforce their IPRs before a
binding authority. °7 The Ministers rejected the attempts of developing
countries to add language into the Declaration stating: "nothing in the
TRIPs Agreement prevents Members from granting compulsory licenses
to foreign suppliers to provide medicines in the domestic markets" and
"nothing in the TRIPs Agreement will prevent Members to grant com-
pulsory licenses to supply foreign markets."'' 8 The Ministers also
rejected proposals by the developing countries and a group of NGO's to
use the limited exceptions of Article 30 to allow producer countries to
manufacture and export patented medicines to countries in a health crisis
even though the pharmaceutical is patented in the producer country.'09 In
arguing against such an amendment, developed countries successfully
maintained that using an Article 30 approach to permit discrimination
against the pharmaceutical industry may run afoul with the requirements
of Article 27 to not discriminate as to the field of technology."' The
103. Doha Declaration, supra note 32, T 5.
104. Id., 6.
105. Id., 17.
106. Id. [ 4-5. "Ministerial Declarations are not binding of Members or the dispute
settlement system, and the agreements negotiated by Members (WTO Agreement) would
certainly prevail over the Doha Declaration, but the Declaration was careful to recognize this
fact and the commitments in TRIPs do no seem to be contradictory to these commitments."
Mercurio, supra note 23, at 228 (footnotes omitted).
107. See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 32, 6; see also Mercurio, supra note
23, at 228.
108. Council for the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposal on
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, June 24,
2002, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/35 1.
109. Mercurio, supra note 23, at 230-32.
110. Id.
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proposals by the NGOs and developing countries may also conflict with
the Article 4 Most Favoured Nation requirement if the country producing
the lower priced drugs were to only make the drugs for nationals of de-
veloping countries and not developed countries.' A final reason that the
Ministers probably did not adopt a new, express exception in the Decla-
ration and resulting Implementation was because a new interpretation of
Article 30 cannot be a covert amendment, but can only be an interpreta-
tion.' 2 An official interpretation, as stated in Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement, "shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the
amendment provisions.""3 Because an official interpretation including a
provision that on its face appears to violate Articles 4 and 27 would vio-
late the amendment provisions, the Ministers could not approve it."
14
Having detailed the rationale and history behind the current under-
standing of the interaction between Articles 27 and 30, the rest of this
Note will explain why the non-discrimination clause in Article 27 guides
the exceptions under Article 30 and that the exceptions under Article 30
are not as limited as they seem.
IV. MEET THE ARTICLES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE ARTICLES IN CONTENTION
As mentioned earlier, Section 5 of the TRIPs Agreement sets the
standards for the availability, scope, and use of patents for protection of
IPRs. "' This Part provides an introduction to the articles that are the
main focus of this Note.
A. Article 27: Hegemon
Article 27.1 is the first paragraph of Section 5: Patents and mandates
that "subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application."' 6 This seemingly limitless re-
quirement to grant patents for inventions that meet all of the elements of
the first sentence of Article 27.1 has an express internal check that sub-
111. Id. at 233.
112. Id. at 234.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 234-35.
115. Notes 27-29, supra.
116. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.1.
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jects the clause to the limiting language of Articles 27.2 and 27.3."' The
exclusions in Articles 27.2 and 27.3 are the only exceptions expressly
named to apply to the availability of patents governed by Article 27.1
within the patents section."1 8 Article 27.2 allows for States to exclude
from patentability those inventions whose commercial exploitation are
necessary to protect the "ordre public, or morality" of a country includ-
ing life, health, and the environment." 9 This exclusion cannot be made
"merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law."'20 Ordre
public and morality are exceptions that allow for a State to decide if the
commercial exploitation of a patent would violate that State's fundamen-
tal social and ethical norms.1 21 Since this is fundamentally a public policy
exception, "TRIPs allows the state to decide for itself whether or not the
prevention of commercial exploitation is 'necessary,'" which means that
theoretically a Member State does not have to consult other States when
deciding whether to exclude a product or process from patentability.
22
TRIPs does limit, however, the actual independence of a Member's deci-
sion because if a dispute over the exception arises, it still falls under
Panel scrutiny. 23 Additionally, when attempting to apply this exception, a
problem arises if a State is trying to use Article 27.2 to allow for the rep-
lication of a product or process by a local producer because the
marketing of the item within the State's boundaries must be completely
outlawed, even to local producers.1 24 The exception becomes even more
narrowly applicable when determining what is "necessary.0 ' To be
"necessary," an exception must be the "least trade restrictive" possible,
meaning there must be no other reasonably available alternatives to pro-
tect the ordre public or morality. 2 6 Thus, even though Article 27.2 is a
public policy exception, it has a limited applicability because the terms
117. Id. TRIPs allows for exclusions because patent protection is not a fundamental
right, but rather one granted to promote public policy goals. Timothy G. Ackermann,
Dis 'ordre'ly Loopholes: TRIPS Patent Protection, GAT, and the ECJ, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 489,
494 (1997).
118. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, § 5.
119. Id. art. 27.2.
120. Id.
121. Ackermann, supra note 117, at 496.
122. Id. at 493.
123. Id. TRIPs cannot allow for complete Member State independence on an Article 27.2
determination because this could encourage sham determinations by countries trying to pur-
posely avoid the TRIPs framework. By allowing third party recourse in the Panel, TRIPs
encourages compliance with the Agreement.
124. George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protec-
tion: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 283, 290 (1998).
125. Ackermann, supra note 117, at 507.
126. Id. (exploring the meaning of GATE XX(b) and using this meaning to derive the
definition of "necessary" within Article 27.2).
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are narrowly construed. 27 Under Article 27.3, Members may exclude
from patentability "diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals."' 21 It also excludes "plants and animals
other than micro-organisms" and "essentially biological processes for
the production of plants or animals.' ' 29 Although this provision seems to
grant developing countries substantial flexibility in the protection of
plants and animals, "in practice this has not been the case."' 30 Article
27.3 "is intended to facilitate the dissemination of innovations in medical
treatment methods," not to allow for a Member State to refuse to patent
pharmaceuticals. 3 ' Article 70.8 further supports this understanding by
requiring Member States "to set up a means of collecting applications
for pharmaceutical patents" because Article 70.8 would be unnecessary
if Article 27.3 allowed the total exclusion of pharmaceuticals.' 32 Addi-
tionally, many developed countries put intense pressure on developing
countries to comply with the narrow understanding by threatening trade
sanctions if a developing country were to formulate a broader under-
standing. 131
Another express requirement for the availability of patents is the
non-discrimination clause of 27.1 that states "Subject to paragraph 4 of
Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, pat-
ents shall be available and patent rights [shall be] enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether the products are imported or locally produced.',3 4 The word
"discriminate" "is a normative term, pejorative in connotation, referring
to results of the unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous
treatment.' 35 Essentially, the clause establishes three genres of discrimi-
nation that are unlawful under TRIPs: (1) discrimination between
127. Id. at 509.
128. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.3.
129. Id.
130. Bender, supra note 6, at 310.
131. Foster, supra note 124, at 290.
132. Id.
133. Bender, supra note 6, at 311-12.
134. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.1 (emphasis added); Champ & Attaran,
supra note 9, at 386. Upon a careful reading of the Article, the "shall be" that falls between
"patents" and "available" in the non-discrimination clause carries across the conjunction
"and" so that the phrase "patent rights enjoyable" contains an understood "shall be." There-
fore, the non-discrimination clause should read "patents shall be available and patent rights
[shall be] enjoyable." Similarly to the first clause of Article 27, the non-discrimination clause
is expressly limited by (1) Article 27.3, (2) paragraph 4 of Article 65, Transitional Arrange-
ments, which discusses the extent a developing Member can delay implementing a patent
system, and (3) paragraph 8 of Article 70, Protection of Existing Subject Matter, which creates
the process for the amelioration of discrimination if the Member does not have a system for
the protection of pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products at the time of entry.
135. Canada--Generic Medicines, supra note 13, at 7.94.
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different fields of technology; (2) discrimination as to place of invention
and; (3) discrimination between imported or locally produced prod-
ucts. 136 Denoted by the use of the word "and" between "available and
patent rights enjoyable" as well as in the series "place of invention, the
field of technology, and whether the products are imported or locally
produced" a country must meet all six requirements to avoid violation of
the non-discrimination clause. 37 Any action that discriminates as to the
availability and enjoyability of patents due to the place of invention, field
of technology, or whether imported or locally produced is subject to the
non-discrimination clause of Article 27.1. Therefore, a violation of the
non-discrimination clause would be a limitation on availability and an
encroachment on a State's obligations under the TRIPs Agreement."'
Thus, "Article 27.1 prohibits discrimination as to enjoyment of 'pat-
ent rights' without qualifying that term."'39 This includes discriminatory
exceptions that block the enjoyment of patents as much as the basic
rights themselves.' 4° "In the [Canada-Generic Medicines] Panel's view,
what was important was that in the rights available under national law,
that is to say those resulting from the basic rights and any permissible
exceptions to them, the forms of discrimination referred to in Article
27.1 should not be present.,"14 ' This language was most likely included
because the authors of the TRIPs Agreement found it necessary to "re-
quire governments to apply exceptions in a non-discriminatory manner,
in order to ensure that governments do not succumb to domestic pres-
sures to limit exceptions to areas where right holders tend to be foreign
producers.' 42 After all, two primary purposes of Article 27.1 "were to
eliminate two types of discrimination that had been practised against
pharmaceuticals and certain other products--either a denial of pat-
entability for such products, or, if patents were granted, automatic
compulsory licences permitting others to manufacture such products for
a fee.' ' 13 Pharmaceuticals provide an excellent example of these interests
136. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.1; Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note
13, 7.92; TRIPs Facts Sheet, supra note 4.
137. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.1 (emphasis added). The clause contains
six separate requirements that a country must satisfy to fulfill the non-discrimination require-
ment because not only must the patent rights be enjoyable "without discrimination as to (1)
"place of invention," (2) "field of technology" and (3) "whether products are imported or lo-
cally produced," but the conjunction "and" denotes that patents must be "available" without
discrimination as to those three elements as well.
138. Id.




143. See id. T 7.90. The Panel suggests that the implementation of the non-
discrimination clause was needed to stop abuses of the system that were going unchecked. In
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because patent holders tend to live in developed countries,'" while those
who most need a less costly replica of the patented product live in the
developing world.14' The developing Members do not have a strong re-
search and development base compared to that of developed countries
so, in a vast majority of cases they are unlikely to have the ability to de-
velop their own medicines.'4 6 Therefore, the non-developed countries
establish a weak intellectual property legal system and begin copying a
product at the expense of a foreign company147 through denying pat-
entability and granting automatic compulsory licenses.' 8
As discussed earlier, the Panel in Canada-Generic Medicines ex-
plored the meaning of Article 27's non-discrimination requirement for
the field of technology and found that the legal scope and adverse effects
of Section 55.2(1) were not limited to the pharmaceutical industry and
the government's purpose of Section 55.2(1) was not to specifically dis-
advantage the pharmaceutical industry, but that Section 55.2(1) applied
to all products. 49 The Panel concluded that the EC's claims of discrimi-
nation did not have merit because the EC "had not presented sufficient
evidence to raise the issue in the face of Canada's formal declaration that
the exception of Section 55.2(1) was not limited to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts."'5 With the combination of the statute's text and Canada's
assurances that the exception applied to every product subject to regula-
order to stymie abuses that could potentially now be carried out in the name of the compulsory
licenses exception under Article 31 and limited exceptions under Article 30, the Panel found
that the non-discrimination requirement applied to both.
144. Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 57, 57 (2002). Ninety-four percent of patents granted world wide and
ninety-one percent of cross-border royalties and technology licenses go to the top ten industri-
alized countries.
145. Bender, supra note 6, at 311-12. HIV/AIDS alone affects millions of people in non-
developed States, and less expensive drug prices could save thousands of lives every year.
146. Ansari, supra note 144, at 57. Developing countries only account for four percent
of world research and development figures.
147. Christopher K. Eppich, Patenting Dilemma: Drugs for Profit Versus Drugs for
Health, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 289, 299-301 (2002). The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America reported that it takes twelve to fifteen years to develop a new drug
at a cost of $500 million. Research and development has yielded roughly fifty percent of all
new commercial pharmaceuticals worldwide in the last twenty years and exportation com-
prises around forty percent of industry-wide sales for the US pharmaceutical industry. The
lack of IPRs in developing countries leads to a $5 billion loss annually, of which an estimated
$900 million would have been available for research and development.
148. Ansari, supra note 144, at 57. This scenario illustrates the issue at the center of the
TRIPs debate: The purpose of TRIPs 27.1, as discussed above, was to make patents available
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination and even though the system may secure
those wishes, one may ask whether this Agreement does so at the expense of the people in
developing countries.
149. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 7.105.
150. Id. 1 7.99.
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tory approval the EC needed to provide convincing contrary evidence
and it did not.'51 This means that the Panel is willing to accept a State's
explanation as to the meaning of the law at issue in determining whether
the State conformed to its TRIPs obligations and is willing to do so
unless it has sufficient reason to doubt the truthfulness of the State's rep-
resentations.5  The Panel's decision, however, challenges States to
fashion their policies in a way that more closely complies with the pur-
poses of TRIPs, making it harder for States to abuse loopholes.'
B. Articles 28 and 30: An Unbreakable Link
While Article 27 mandates the availability of patents and enjoyment
of patent rights without discrimination, Article 28: Rights Conferred ac-
tually confers the rights granted to a patent holder.' Article 28 gives the
patent owner the "exclusive rights" "to prevent third parties not having
the owners consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing" the product, the process, and the product from the
process protected under the patent.'55 The patent owner may also assign,
transfer by succession, and license the patent to third parties. 5 6 The only
express limitation upon Article 28 within its text is in a footnote that sub-
jects it to Article 6 which is not applicable to this discussion.' Taking
the text of Articles 28.1 and 33 on their ordinary meaning, it would seem
the exclusive rights of patents conferred in Article 28.1 cannot be in-
fringed upon (minus the exceptions later discussed) for at least twenty
years from the original grant or filing date of original grant.'58 Hence,
any law allowing the making, using, offering for sale, selling, or import-
ing of a product without the patent holders permission is a violation of




153. Id. 1 7.94.
154. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 27-28; Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at
382-83. Hence, Article 27 establishes the basic standard that States must adopt within their
patent system, but it does not grant any express rights for a patent holder.
155. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 28.1(a); Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and
Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 601,
655 (2000). "Article 28 thus provides that an owner of a patented process shall have an exclu-
sive right to prevent all others from using the patented process."
156. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 28.2.
157. Id. arts. 6, 28 n.7. "This right, like all others conferred under this Agreement in
respect of the use, sale, importation or other distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions
of Article 6."
158. Id. arts. 28, 33.
159. Id. arts. 28, 30, 31; Canada--Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 17.18.
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Understandably, one limitation on Article 28 is the applicability of
Article 27.1 because if a country rightfully exercises one of its excep-
tions to patentability under Article 27, the innovator does not have the
ability to patent its innovation, and, therefore, no rights would be con-
ferred.' 60 Another limitation on the rights in Article 28 is under Article 32
where a company can have its patent revoked or forfeited if judicial re-
view finds such action appropriate.
61
The exclusive use protected by Article 28 has two other exceptions
that may be used in limited circumstances: Articles 30 and 3 162 Article
30: Exceptions to Rights Conferred states:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not un-
reasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the pat-
ent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.
63
The link between Articles 28 and 30 rests on the words "limited ex-
ceptions to the exclusive rights conferred."' 6 Article 28 utilizes the phrase
"exclusive rights" to describe the rights a patent confers unto its owner and
Article 30 contains language that allows States to "provide limited excep-
tions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent."' 65 Article 27 does not
grant any exclusive rights, however; it establishes that a government must
make patents available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination,
as long as the item meets all the requirements of the Article and is not sub-
ject to one of the internal limitations.'" As a matter of fact, the internal
limitations within Article 27.1 are all exclusions to the actual patentabil-
ity of the items affected and do not even address what rights a patent
holder possesses. 67 The limitations, just as Article 27.1 as a whole,
160. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 27-28.
161. Id. arts. 28, 32.
162. Id. arts. 30, 31. The compulsory licenses of Article 31 are a popular method to
avoid the rights conferred under Article 28, but will only be addressed in a limited capacity
here.
163. Id. art. 30.
164. Id. arts. 28, 30.
165. Id.
166. Id. art. 27. The term "internal limitations" is a reference to the provisions and arti-
cles that sentences one and two of Article 27.1 are subject to. Although Article 27 does not use
the term "exclusive," it reinforces Article 28's concept of exclusivity by stating that "patent
rights [shall be] enjoyable without discrimination."
167. Id. arts. 27.1-27.3, 65.4, 70.8. Article 27.3 in its pertinent part, describes "what
members may exclude from patentability." Article 65.4 allows a state to extend the introduc-
tion of patent protection for items "not so protectable in its territory." Article 70.8 addresses
the steps a state must take to protect pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products when
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merely describe when a State must make patents available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination. ' Minus an express link such as
between Articles 28 and 30, one may question whether the limitations of
Article 30 should apply to Article 27.1.169 "Because the fundamental
principle behind the patent provisions is to provide exclusive rights, al-
lowing article 30 to provide an exception for all activity would be
improper."'
' 70
Returning back to a pure discussion of Article 30, this Article:
Establishes three criteria that must be met in order to qualify for
an exception: (1) the exception must be "limited"; (2) the excep-
tion must not "unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of
the patent"; (3) the exception must not "unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties."'71
These three tests or "conditions" are cumulative in nature which
means each is "a separate and independent requirement that must be sat-
isfied"' 72 "Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions results
in the Article 30 exception being disallowed.' '173 When interpreting the
conditions, they must be "interpreted in relation to each other" and each
"must be presumed to mean something different from the other two, or
else there would be redundancy."'74 Even though an exception may be
"limited" under the first condition, it can still violate the second and
third; likewise, if the exception is both limited and does not "unreasona-
bly conflict with a normal exploitation" it could still violate test three
it does not make those patents available on the Agreement's date of entry into force. Ho, supra
note 155, at 658-59. "Interpreting the patent enforcement right requirement in view of the
patentability exceptions of article 27 is inappropriate, as article 27's exceptions expressly
pertain to patentability, not enforceability."
168. Id.
169. Ho, supra note 155, at 661. "The article cannot be reasonably interpreted to swal-
low entirely the substantive patent provisions of TRIPS. Panel decisions ... have reinforced
the idea that exceptions are intended to be just that-exceptions that do not emasculate the
general principles established in the agreements." See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange
TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules,
and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1108 (1996), reprinted in Special Series: The Journey in Review: A Look
Back at Twenty-Five Years of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Eco-
nomic Law, 25 U. PA. INT'L Bus. L. 1079 (2004). "Although Article 30 does not condition
exceptions on national purpose, it does impose conditions on the right to make exceptions to
the overall Agreement. These conditions are logical, because there is no evidence that Article
30 was intended as an all-purpose opt-out from TRIPs patent rules." Id.
170. Ho, supra note 155, at 661.
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and "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner."175
Test one dictates that any exception to Article 28 must be "lim-
ited.' 7 6 The Panel in Canada-Generic Medicines agreed with the EC's
assertion that the word "limited" meant "narrow, small, minor, insignifi-
cant or restricted'"177 rather than the broader definition of "confined
within definite limits," or "restricted in scope, extent, amount" presented
by Canada.7 1 Whether an exception is "limited" is not just a determina-
tion as to how many of the five rights granted by Article 28 were
impaired, but a measure as to the extent each patent owner's rights were
infringed. 79 At the same time, a "limited" exception is not one that just
preserves a single right such as selling because each right was included
in TRIPs so they are all "meaningful and independent part[s] of the pat-
ent owner's rights."'"8
The first balancing test within Article 30 lies within the second crite-
ria: "such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent."'' Two main questions arise from this test: (1)
what is a "normal exploitation" and (2) what is an "unreasonabl[e] con-
flict.
,,82
"Normal exploitation" is the "regular, usual, typical, ordinary, [or]
conventional"'83 "commercial activity by which patent owners employ
their exclusive patent rights to extract economic value from their pat-
ent.' " 4 In explaining this definition, the Panel opined: "The normal
practice of exploitation by patent owners, as with owners of any other
intellectual property right, is to exclude all forms of competition that
could detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a
patent's grant of market exclusivity."'85 As applied to Canada-Generic
175. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30; Canada--Generic Medicines, supra note
13, 7.21.
176. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30; Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note
13, 7.20.
177. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 1 7.28. A standard as lax as the Cana-
dian proposal which follows could seemingly open up many more loopholes to the agreement
than originally planned by defining the term so broadly.
178. Id. 7.27.
179. Id. 7.32. The five rights referred to in this sentence are the "making, using, offer-
ing for sale, selling, or importing" provided for in Article 28. The Panel made perfectly clear
that the standard was not how many rights were violated, but to what extent they were vio-
lated: "A very small act could well violate all five rights provided by Article 28.1 and yet leave
each of the patent owner's rights intact for all useful purposes."
180. Id.
181. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30.
182. Id.
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Medicines, the Panel disagreed with Canada's assessment that "normal
exploitation" did not include the years immediately after the term of pro-
tection because some patent rights "will typically produce a certain
period of market exclusivity after the expiration of a patent."'86 After all,
the Panel believed that a truly effective use of patent rights depended on
the circumstances of the individual product markets and standards.'87 An
example justifying this line of reason is the right to prevent the "making"
of patented products during the patent term.' 8 If TRIPs guarantees that
other actors cannot make the patented product for the entire twenty years
of market exclusivity, then naturally there will be a layover period im-
mediately following the patent term until a market competitor can
"make" enough copied products to vigorously compete in the open mar-
ket. 9 The Panel agreed, however, with Canada's general proposition that
the "defacto market exclusivity" created by the patent rights does not
preclude Canada from allowing the regulatory review process to proceed
during the patent term.'9 The extended market exclusivity is not guaran-
teed as a "natural exploitation" of patent rights, but is an unintended
process of the patent rights and regulatory rules not overlapping prop-
erly.'9 ' The Panel quickly qualified its acceptance of the Canadian
exception under test two by saying that the regulatory process caused the
overlap and that most products do not have to worry about such a prob-
lem.' 92 This explanation probably means that the Panel saw the
circumstances caused by the regulatory process as unique and a limited
reason to allow for the Canadian exception since the very nature of the
products is what caused the de facto extension of market exclusivity.' 93
The definition of "unreasonably" within this test was not explored
by the Panel, but in ordinary terms means "not reasonable; immoderate;
exorbitant."' 194 The word reasonable means "suitable under the
186. Id. 7.56.
187. Id. 7.55. The Panel felt that the application of patent rights had to change depend-
ing on technological developments and effective marketing practices. Patents create a period
of market exclusivity as an incentive for innovation of new products and the owners of patents,
as part of their reward for the investment in innovation, should be able to take "effective ad-
vantage" of their patents-even if this market exclusivity reaches beyond the 20 year patent






193. See id. The Panel's language seems to limit the application of such an exception
because it stresses how this extension is not "natural or normal," "an unintended conse-
quence," and for most products does not apply because there is no "marketing approval
process for competitors."
194. Black's Law Dictionary 1538 (6th Ed. 1990).
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circumstances" and "fit and appropriate to the end in view."' 95 In other
words, if the action is a normal exploitation of patent rights and a coun-
try's regulatory rules conflict with the exploitation, the conflict must be
"fit and appropriate" under the object and purposes of the treaty to avoid
an encroachment of the rights granted by TRIPs.
96
The final test in Article 30 is that an exception cannot "unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties.'" 97 This clause also demands a
balancing test, broken down into four considerations: (1) what are "le-
gitimate interests of the patent owner"; (2) does the exception
unreasonably prejudice those legitimate interests; (3) what are the le-
gitimate interests of third parties and; (4) considering the third party's
legitimate interests, does the exception unreasonably prejudice the le-
gitimate interests of patent owners. 98 Similarly to the second condition
of Article 30, this test also asks whether it is acceptable to remove the
additional period of market exclusivity by having such an exception.'" In
arguing the definition of "legitimate interests," the EC claimed that "le-
gitimate interests" were essentially the legal rights of the patent holder
and the third parties and since the legal rights of the patent owner pre-
scribed under Article 28 were for exclusive making, using, and selling of
the product or process by the owner, only the patent owner could engage
in Article 28 actions during the patent term?.0 This definition created an
even more favorable standard for the EC when combined with their ex-
tremely narrow definition of "third parties" which the EC defined not as
other countries, but competitor drug companies. 20' Correspondingly, as
competitor drug companies held no legal right to the production, use, or
sale of the products or processes during the patent term, they have no
legitimate interest in the exception.20 The Panel dismissed this circular
195. Id. at 1265.
196. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30; Canada--Generic Medicines, supra note
13, [ 7.20-7.22. Both the EC and Canada argued that Articles 7 and 8 were important to
understanding the true meaning of Article 30 and its application under these circumstances. Id.
7.23.
197. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30; Canada--Generic Medicines, supra note
13,1 7.60.
198. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30.
199. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 1 7.61. This test, much like the second
condition, boils down to two questions-(l) does Canada have a legitimate interest in this
exception and (2) does the exception unreasonably prejudice the patent holder?
200. Id. i 7.62-7.63.
201. Id. 7.62. The EC claims that competitor drug companies are the only applicable
third parties because they are the "only parties with interests adverse to those of patent own-
ers."
202. Id. 7.63-7.64. The competitor companies held no legal right because the text of
the treaty demands that twenty years be the applicable patent term. Interestingly, the EC ar-
gued that the rights and interests granted under TRIPs cannot conflict with social welfare
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definition stating that "legitimate interests" were not just legal rights, but
"a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are 'justifiable'
in the sense that they are supported by relevant public policies or other
social norms., 203 This definition considers interests outside of the eco-
nomic world of the pharmaceutical industry and examines what society
may see as "legitimate interests." 20 After all, a definition that rests solely
on legal rights would make the rest of Article 30 redundant.0 The Panel
did not directly define "third parties," but in its rejection of the EC's nar-
row legal rights argument and emphasis on public policies, one could
believe that relevant third parties include governments.a After all, the
Panel earlier recognized Canada's interest in ensuring that products that
have to go through a strict regulatory process are market ready by the
end of the patent term through the use of such exceptions.207 Additionally
the Panel rejected the EC's argument that since they have to satisfy the
regulatory process during the patent term this shortens their market ex-
clusivity and the de facto extension after the twenty year term helps
alleviate this burden.0 8 Such a burden was not found compelling enough
to justify a finding against Canada because the actual legitimacy of such
an interest was still being debated in the WTO community and it is not
the role of adjudication to make such a decision.20
VI. A HUMBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN ARTICLES 27, 28, AND 30
As previously stated, to truly understand the meaning and interaction
of the Articles, one must study the treaty as a whole. t Outside of Sec-
tion 5 are four provisions that help guide the overall understanding and
meaning of the TRIPs Agreement: Article 3; National Treatment; Article
4; Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment; Article 7 Objectives; and Article 8
policy. However, the EC established this claim within the context that the general welfare
demands protection of the full patent term. One may question whether the general welfare that
this exception is guaranteed to protect involves the social welfare via patent rights, or social
welfare via decreased pharmaceutical costs at the expiration of the patent term.
203. Id. 7.69. This interpretation of "legitimate interests" is also supported by Article
9(2) of the Berne Convention from which this element is taken verbatim.
204. Id.
205. Id. 17.68.
206. Id. IN 7.68-7.69, 7.73.
207. Id. 7.54-7.59.
208. Id. (9i 7.82-7.83. Interestingly, the Panel says that a number of countries agreed
with the EC's claim that companies affected by the regulatory process deserve the de facto
extension, even some countries going as far as to grant compensatory patent term extensions.
209. Id. The Panel believed this is a normative policy issue that is still a matter of unre-
solved political debate.
210. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 383.
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Principles. Articles 3 and 4 establish the minimum non-discrimination
standards of the TRIPs Agreement,' whereas Articles 7 and 8 are an
internal interpretative authority that must be used whenever analyzing
the meaning of distinct provisions."' The meaning of these provisions as
laid out below will guide the discussion of the articles' interaction.
Before moving to the articles mentioned above, one must also briefly
establish the other basic interpretation tools provided for in TRIPs. Arti-
cle 1: Nature and Scope of Obligations and Article 2: Intellectual
Property Conventions both guarantee that the rights and obligations of
the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Rome Convention and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits shall be
enforced in addition to the express language within TRIPs-with the
TRIPs Agreement overriding any conflict.23 Additionally, under Article
5: Multilateral Agreements on Acquisition or Maintenance of Protection,
the obligations under Articles 3 and 4 do not apply to agreements under
WIPO "relating to the acquisition or maintenance of intellectual property
rights. 2t4 Therefore in determining a Member State's obligations under
TRIPS, the evaluator must look at the text of the TRIPs Agreement itself
as well as the responsibilities under other intellectual property agree-
ments.1 5
A. National Treatment and Most Favoured
Nation Status, TRIPs Style
Two cornerstones of the world trading system are national treatment
and most favoured nation status (MFN).1 6 The first case to address both
MFN and national treatment under the TRIPs Agreement was United
States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (Havana Club)
which involved Sections 211(a)(2) and (b) of the Omnibus Appropria-
tions Act.17 The Omnibus Act discussed the treatment of trademarks that
had been confiscated by the Cuban government after the communists
came to power.2'8 The EC contended that discriminatory treatment was
extended to "successors-in-interest" and "original owners" of confis-
211. United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (Havana Club),
Jan. 2, 2002, DSR 2002:11589, WTO Doc. WT/DS 176/AB/R.
212. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 1 7.26.
213. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1-2.
214. Id. art. 5.
215. Id. arts. 1-5.
216. Havana Club, supra note 211, P 241, 297. Both obligations are essential to 1994
GATI, and at the Uruguay Round, the WTO inserted these provisions into the TRIPs Agree-
ment.
217. Id. § IIA.
218. Id. 4. "Havana Club" was a trademark confiscated by the Cuban government from
an American company and sold to a European company.
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cated trademarks who were foreign nationals.2 9 The Appellate Body
found the United States had violated its national treatment obligations
under Article 3.1 TRIPs by discriminating against non-U.S. nationals
who were successors in interest under Section 211 (a)(2) and discriminat-
ing against non-U.S. nationals who were original owners under Section
211(a)(2) and (b).220 Additionally, the Appellate Body found that the
United States had violated its MFN obligations under Article 4 TRIPs by
affording better treatment to "non-Cuban foreign nationals" than Cuban
nationals.22'
1. National Treatment
The Appellate Body explained that "[t]he national treatment obliga-
tion is a fundamental principle underlying the TRIPS Agreement, just as
it has been in what is now the GATT 1994.",222 It further stated: "As ar-
ticulated in Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the national treatment
principle calls on WTO Members to accord no less favourable treatment
to non-nationals than to nationals in the 'protection' of trade-related in-
tellectual property rights '23 and this protection extends to "matters
affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights as well as those matters affecting the
use of intellectual property rights specifically addressed in this [TRIPs]
Agreement."
224
An additional aspect to the TRIPs national treatment provision is its
unique phrase "only where such exceptions are necessary to secure com-
pliance with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement and where such practices are not applied in
219. Id. E 43-47.
220. Id. V 268, 281. The provision says a US court cannot "recognize, enforce, or oth-
erwise validate any assertion of rights by a 'designated national' that claims its interest from
the confiscated property." Id. 1 247. The Appellate Body explained that "even the possibility
that non-United States successors-in-interest face two hurdles is inherently less favourable
than the undisputed fact that United States successors-in-interest face only one." Id. 265.
221. Id. 319. The EC alleged a MFN violation against the United States for granting
"non-Cuban foreign nationals" preferential treatment as compared to Cuban nationals saying
that Sections 211 (a)(2) and (b) were prima facie discriminatory against Cuban nationals be-
cause the words "designated national" within the section only applied to original owners who
were Cuban nationals. Id. H 307-09. The Appellate Body agreed-stating that Cuban nation-
als who reside in the "authorized trade territory" face an additional administrative procedure
that does not apply to non-Cuban foreign nationals who are original owners, because the latter
are not "designated nationals." Id. 314.
222. Id. 242. The Appellate Body emphasizes the absolute importance of this provision
and how its additional inclusion in the TRIPs Agreement even after its inclusion in GATT
1994 and the Paris Convention both of which are interpretive tools of TRIPS, shows how im-
portant the TRIPs negotiators found the provision.
223. Id. 243.
224. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3 n.3.
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on trade. 225
Such a phrase in not found in the GATT Article III, but comparable lan-
guage, "disguised restriction on trade," is present in the chapeau of
Article XX GATT which restricts "exceptions to substantive obligations"
of the GATT including national treatment if the "measures are not ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade. 226 Looking
at the interpretations of similar GATT provisions is useful in determining
the meaning of the disguised restriction clause because the clause is a
limitation upon the substantive exceptions to national treatment under
GAIT just as it is a limitation on the substantive exceptions to national
treatment under TRIPs. Following the GATT standard, a disguised re-
striction on trade under TRIPs is any constraint that meets the
requirements of an exception under TRIPs, but is actually a "disguise to
conceal the pursuit of trade-restrictive objectives. 228 Therefore, an ex-
ception to Article 3 TRIPs would not be available to a Member State
who tried to disguise a trade restrictive objective through a seemingly
valid exception.
2. Most Favoured Nation Status
Just as the Appellate Body accorded great respect to the national
treatment provisions of TRIPs, it placed great importance upon MFN as
well: "As a cornerstone of the world trading system, the most-favoured-
nation obligation must be accorded the same significance with respect to
intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement that it has long
been accorded with respect to trade in goods under the GATT. It is, in a
word, fundamental. 229 MFN treatment in Article 4 guarantees for intel-
lectual property rights that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be ac-
corded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
225. Id. art. 3.
226. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. III, XX; US-Importation of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(United States-Shrimp), May, 15, 1998, DSR 1998: VII 2755, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R
(explaining the meaning of Article XX).
227. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3; GATr, supra note 226, art. XX. Such an
exercise is valid because when interpreting Articles 3 and 4 in Havana Club the Appellate
Body compared TRIPs and GATT provisions as two foundations of international trade. Ha-
vana Club, supra note 211, 242, 297.
228. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products (EC-Asbestos), Sept. 18, 2000, DSR 2001: VIII 3305, WTO Doc. WVT/DS135/R P
8.236.
229. Havana Club, supra note 211, 297.
[Vol. 26:899
Staying Within the Negotiated Framework
Members., 230 Article 4 does contain four exceptions including agree-
ments on intellectual property that were "entered into force prior to the
entry into force of the WTO Agreement," if the Council for TRIPs was
notified of those agreements and the agreements "do not constitute an
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other mem-
bers. 213' To ensure that a provision does not infringe upon national
treatment or MFN obligations, the legislation cannot be prima facie dis-
criminatory.23 2 If it is prima facie discriminatory, the Member must show
that enforcement of the provision would not lead to discriminatory
treatment under any circumstances.233
B. Objectives and Principles of TRIPs
Articles 7 and 8 establish the foundation for determining whether a
234State action helps further the purposes of the TRIPs Agreement.
Article 7: Objectives states:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mu-
tual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 35
Article 8: Principles provides:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect health and nu-
trition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological develop-
ment, provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement.
230. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.
231. Id. Therefore, aside from the obligations to other treaties established in Articles 1
and 2, MFN expressly contains language that demands the reference to other agreements in
determining MFN duties.
232. Havana Club, supra note 211, 307-09, 317-18.
233. See id. 282-82, 310-11.
234. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 7.26; Wesley A. Cann Jr., On the
Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of Less-Developed Countries
for Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply Under a Theory of Progres-
sive Global Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 755, 806-07 (2004). "The
Declaration on TRIPS also recognized that each provision of the TRIPS Agreement must be
interpreted in light of the Agreement's objectives and principles as is mandated by Article 31
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."
235. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7.
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2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort
to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect
the international transfer of technology.
236
A careful balance must be sought between what some countries
would argue is a legitimate use of Articles 7 and 8 to further a Member's
socio-economic policies while others would say that using the provisions
in Articles 7 and 8 too aggressively would amount to a renegotiation of
the TRIPs Agreement. 7 The text recognizes the importance of techno-
logical innovation and the dissemination of that technology, and wants
the innovation and dissemination to be mutually advantageous to users
and producers.23' An example of such an arrangement is that Company A
sells a new pharmaceutical at a reasonable price to cover its costs and
create profits while Country B's population can readily consume said
pharmaceuticals, alleviating a public health concern. Both actors bene-
fited from the innovation and transfer because Company A recovered its
costs and made profits on the drug, the innovation and dissemination of
which were driven by the demand in Country B, and Country B bene-
fited from the innovation and dissemination because the new drug cured
a public health crisis. The second part of Article 7 adds an additional
dimension to the objectives: the protection and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights must be "conducive to social and economic
welfare.'2 39 Hence, "Article 7 speaks in terms of protecting intellectual
property in a way that creates a 'mutual advantage' for producers and
consumers, that establishes a 'balance of rights and obligations' and that
is applied 'in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare.' ,240
As argued in Canada-Generic Medicines, the social and economic
welfare of a State can be very different than the potential patent rights of
a company-the EC companies stood to lose C$100 million per year
236. Id. art. 8.
237. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, U 7.24-7.25. Canada argued that
Articles 7 and 8 ensure that States can balance their socio-economic interests against the pat-
ent rights created by TRIPs. This means that Canada's exceptions should be allowed because
TRIPs demands that governments have the "necessary flexibility to adjust patent rights to
maintain the desired balance with other important national policies." The EC criticized this
view as being too broad because even though the articles allow for the balance between patent
rights and governmental policies, Canada's interpretation would amount to a renegotiation of
TRIPs. The EC also pointed to Article 8.1 to explain that even though States can balance their
TRIPs obligations against their socio-economic policies, Member States must do so in a way
that is consistent with their TRIPs obligations.
238. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7.
239. Id.
240. Cann, supra note 234, at 807.
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from the Canadian exceptions, but at the same time, Canada had a rec-
ognized interest of wanting to keep its citizens' health care costs to a
minimum. 24' Thus, "all provisions of the TRIPS Agreement must be
viewed in terms of a bargained-for exchange, and the protection of intel-
lectual property must be seen not merely as a static set of rules, but as a
mandated 'process' ultimately leading to a series of mandated bene-
fits.
,242
Article 8: Principles seemingly lends more guidance for the objec-
tives in Article 7 by providing for the promotion of "the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their [the country in question] socio-
economic and technological development" and expressly listing "meas-
ures necessary to protect public health and nutrition" as items a country
can consider when "formulating or amending their laws and regulations"
to comply with TRIPs. 243 Also allowable under Article 8.2 are "appropri-
ate measures" to prevent IPRs owners from: (1) abusing their rights;
(2) using practices that "unreasonably restrain trade"; or (3) "adversely
affect the international transfer of technology."2" The phrase "provided
that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement,"
however, creates a circular line of reasoning that some people have ar-
gued limits these principles to determinations that a questionable action
is within the rights granted by the Agreement. 5
Although Article 8 seems to provide substantial latitude to Member
States in applying exceptions for public health,2" the leeway is not
unlimited. 7 Members may take measures to prevent "abuse" of IPRs,
but these procedures must remain consistent with the TRIPs Agree-
ment.48 Secondly, in using the term "necessary," Article 8 seems to
"indicate that the imposition of these measures are not within the abso-
lute discretion of the invoking Member, but are instead subject to
potential WTO review in regard to their validity."249 Finally, "the phrase
'provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of the
Agreement' is substantially more restrictive than the "General Excep-
tions" found in Article XX of the [GATT] 1994, which allows measures
241. Canada -Generic Medicines, supra note 13, U 7.24-7.25.
242. Cann, supra note 234, at 808.
243. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8.
244. Id.
245. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 7.24-7.25.
246. Cann, supra note 234, at 808-09.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 809.
249. Id. at 808. Comparatively, this wording seems stricter than the security exception in
Article 73 which provides a Member State much more freedom by placing a subjective stan-
dard ("it considers necessary").
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that would otherwise be inconsistent with the GATT Agreement."250 Arti-
cle 8 is not an exception to TRIPs, but "a guiding principle upon which
all other provisions of the Agreement must be read." '
Although the Panel in Canada-Generic Medicines did not directly
define or limit Articles 7 or 8, one may imply some explanations from its
judgment. First, the Panel said when determining whether an exception
falls within Article 30, one must use Articles 7 and 8 to fully understand
the applicable texts and ensure that any interpretation furthers the objects
and purposes of the Agreement.25 ' Thus, the Panel must have felt that
Canada's regulatory review exception in Section 55.2(1) was valid under
the objects and purposes of TRIPs because it deemed the exception
valid.253 This means that in certain circumstances when regulatory review
of a product is mandated by a government before the product is released
on the market, a government could allow for an imitative product to be-
gin the review process before the initial twenty year patent term
254expires. Correspondingly, Canada's "stockpiling exception" in Section
55.2(2) deemed invalid under Article 28 cannot be within the objects and
purposes of TRIPs, meaning that under Article 30 a State will need a
greater social or economic interest than ensuring lower priced medicines
immediately upon the expiration of the patent term for its exception to
fall within the objects and purposes of TRIPs.2 The Panel, however, was
inconsistent in its analysis of the de facto patent term extension-saying
"it must be recognized that enforcement of the right to exclude 'making'
and 'using' during the patent term will necessarily give all patent own-
ers, for all products, a short period of extended market exclusivity after
the patent expires''26 when discussing the "stockpiling exception," but
declaring "the additional period of market exclusivity in this situation is
not a natural or normal consequence of enforcing patent rights. It is an
unintended consequence of the conjunction of the patent laws with prod-
uct regulatory laws" while talking about the regulatory review
exception.2 7 Despite this unpredictability, it seems that Articles 7 and 8
250. Id. at 808-09.
251. Id. at 809.
252. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 1 7.26.
253. See id. After all, by default, if such an exception were not acceptable under the
object and purposes of TRIPs it cannot be valid under a more specific provision.
254. Id. $ 7.24-7.25, 7.84, 7.104.
255. Id. 7.35-7.38.
256. Id.
257. Id. 7.57. This footnote shows the trouble that a State or the DSB can have in
maintaining a consistent theory and understanding of the objects and purposes of the TRIPs
Agreement and how the same balancing test can lead to such different conclusions on the
same issue. Such inconsistency makes it difficult for States to predict a potential judgment by
the DSB.
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allow for a broad reading of the TRIPs Agreement, especially since the
Panel allowed the regulatory review exception that so blatantly violated
Article 28.1. Some scholars have interpreted the text of Articles 7 and 8
very broadly following Canada-Generic Medicines, with two scholars
arguing that "it would be a poor lawyer indeed or a particularly malevo-
lent government that could not devise a TRIPs consistent way to
accomplish its objectives related to any of those [public health and nutri-
tion] policy areas.'258
C. Articles 27 and 30--an Unequal Duel
When the Panel in Canada-Generic Medicines addressed the rela-
tionship between Article 27.1 and Articles 30 and 31, it stated that both
Articles 30 and 31 were subject to the non-discrimination clause because
"Article 27.1 prohibits discrimination as to enjoyment of 'patent rights'
without qualifying that term. ' The Panel further opines: "a discrimina-
tory exception that takes away enjoyment of a patent right is
discrimination as much as is discrimination in the basic rights them-
selves.' 2 ° Some commentators tend to disagree with this interpretation,
however, saying that if Article 27 preempts Articles 30 and 31, this
would severely limit the ability of states to use the exceptions provided
for in those Articles.26' In fact, they claim that Articles 27 and 28 are tied
together as general propositions within the treaty and that Articles 30
and 31 are specific exceptions to the rights granted by Articles 27 and
28.262 Developing Members also promoted such an authoritative interpre-
tation of Articles 30 and 31, especially following the Doha
Declaration.263 However, this author respectfully disagrees because "a
widespread and factually unlimited authoritative interpretation of Article
30 of the type advocated by the developing countries, would ultimately
undermine the social benefits of patent rights. 264 Such an understanding
258. Peter N. Fowler & Alice T. Zalik, A U.S. Government Perspective Concerning the
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property: Past, Present and Near
Future, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 401,412-13 (2003).
259. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 7.91.
260. Id.
261. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 386. These authors write in the content of Bra-
zilian local working permits. The Brazilian law that was meant to bring Brazil into compliance
allowed for the Brazilian government to authorize a compulsory license if the "patent owner
does not manufacture the product in the territory of Brazil within three years of the patent
grant." The law allowed for exceptions to this rule, but the United States claimed in a Panel
complaint which was later settled out of the DSB.
262. Id. at 386-90.
263. Thomas A. Haag, TRIPS Since Doha: How Far Will the WTO GO Toward Modify-
ing the Terms for Compulsory Licensing?, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 945, 957-60
(2002).
264. Id. at 965-66.
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by Member States would "greatly hamper the 'dissemination and ad-
vancement of technical knowledge' because it would encourage
inventors to maintain their inventions as trade secrets as the only mecha-
nism of protection for their intellectual and financial investments. 265
This would cause an end result of limiting the dissemination of technol-
ogy, which is "clearly contrary to the objectives recited in Articles 7 and
8 ,,266
With all the contrasting opinions 67 and interests268 that lay in this
field, one must tread lightly when trying to determine how to interpret
Section 5 Patents. Three main themes of the TRIPs negotiations regard-
ing patents were: (1) non-discrimination; (2) terms of patent protection;
and (3) compulsory licenses and exceptions. 269 Although the exact non-
discrimination clause in the text today did not appear in any of the previ-
270ous submitted drafts, it has legitimate backing within the negotiations.
The United States, Japan, Australia, the EC, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Canada, Brazil, and the Nordic Countries all called for the appearance of
national treatment provisions within the TRIPs Agreement and most of
these countries called for MFN status as well.' Canada, Hong Kong, the
Nordic Countries, Australia, and Japan all called for additional non-
discriminatory provisions.272 Some developing countries were concerned
that a rigid non-discrimination standard would not allow them to have
exceptions for specific sectors such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
food stuffs that are necessary for further development, especially since
many of the developed countries had just recently added protection for
these sectors to their state patent laws. 73
265. Id. at 966.
266. Id.
267. Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPs Agreement, 22 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307 (2004); Champ & Attaran, supra note 9; Hagg, supra note 263; Kiehl,
supra note 12; Weissman, supra note 169.
268. See supra Part IV.
269. See Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 11-12 May
1989, Feb. 2, 1990, GAIT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGI1I/W/32/Rev.2, 92-93, 98-103, 106-07
[hereinafter Negotiating Group W32r2].
270. See Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 27 March 1990,
Mar. 28, 1990, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGll/W/68; Negotiating Group W32r2 at 86-89,
106-07.
271. Negotiating Group W32r2 at 84-85.
272. Id.
273. Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group on 2, 4 and 5 April
1990, Apr. 24, 1990, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG1 I/W/20 31 [hereinafter Negotiating Group
W20]. Exceptions to patentability for these products were seen as essential by many develop-
ing States who as previously mentioned found them essential for continued development
compared to some developed countries who felt that the purpose of protecting patent rights
would be too severely hurt in those areas. Id. 35.
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As strongly as the developed countries argued the need for non-
discrimination provisions within TRIPs, the developing countries ex-
pressed their desire for a continuance of compulsory licenses to allow for
governments to adjust to their State's needs.27 The Members may have
purposefully left Article 30 ambiguous as to satisfy all parties and finish
negotiations.275 Countries expressed concern during the negotiations that
phrases such as the "'legitimate' interest of the patent owner and of third
parties" should be defined so as to provide more certainty in applica-
tion.276 Other countries such as Brazil wished for TRIPs to provide
"greater flexibility for the patent system in order to take account of the
special needs of developing countries." '277
When interpreting the interaction between Articles 27 and 30, an es-
sential foundation that one must consider is that "Article 27 of the TRIPs
Agreement allows a country to deny intellectual property protection in a
few, narrowly defined areas, and in other situations create a unique sys-
tem in their country for regulating the patentability of certain
products. 2 78 The non-discrimination clause therefore, "does not take
away the rights of a country to regulate a certain product; it just recog-
nizes the unique need of certain countries to regulate in a manner most
beneficial to their country."
279
In discussing the field of technology exception, the Panel differenti-
ated between the ability to discriminate in certain product areas and the
illegality of discrimination in fields of technology.28 Though the Panel
provided no theoretical example to explain the difference between prod-
uct areas and fields of technology, this distinction may lie within the
definition of Article 30 itself because with the Panel accepting the EC's
"limited exceptions" definition of "narrow, small, minor, insignificant or
restricted," a "limited exception" becomes an exception for a single
product or single genre of products within the pharmaceuticals field. 1
Sweeping legislation that provided for an exception for all pharmaceuti-
cal products would probably not pass the "limited exceptions" or
274. Negotiating Group W32r2, supra note 269, at 98-103. Developed countries coun-
tered the developing countries by demanding that compulsory licenses have express
limitations so as to limit abuse. Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group
on 16-19 May 1988, June 21, 1988, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGIl/W/7 12.
275. Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group on 5-8 July 1988,
Aug. 29, 1988, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG l/W/8 37.
276. Id.
277. Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group on 17-21 Oct. 1988,
Nov. 30, 1988, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG l/W/10 19.
278. Kruger, supra note 31, at 201.
279. Id. at 201-02.
280. See Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 1 7.92.
281. See id.
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non-discrimination test, but an exception for a single product or a couple
of products within the pharmaceuticals field would presumptively pass
the limited exceptions test and the field of technology element of non-
discrimination.2 Such a decision in itself shows the Panel's willingness
to allow exceptions for certain products under Article 30 as long as the
exception meets the balancing tests. 3
This interpretation of Article 27's relation to Article 30 is even more
supported in the period following the Doha Declaration. 24 This period
has seen even the most ardent supporters of very limited exceptions to
Article 30 loosening their positions, with the United States and the EC
both suggesting what they consider legal methods under Article 30 (and
thereby Article 27) to fulfill the pharmaceutical needs of developing
countries. The stricter of the two, the American approach, called for
allowing a:
developing country Member having sufficient manufacturing ca-
pacity in the pharmaceutical sector to export needed
pharmaceuticals to a developing or least-developed country that
is afflicted by a public health problem, especially those resulting
from HIV/AIDs, malaria, tuberculosis, and other epidemics; and
has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceu-
tical sector.
'28 6
This proposal truly weighs the objectives in Article 7 TRIPs evenly-
contributing to the promotion of innovation by strictly limiting the im-
pact of the exception; promoting the transfer and dissemination of
technology by allowing a developing Member State with the required
282. See id. n 7.92-7.105. As discussed earlier, the Panel in Canada-Generic Medi-
cines in fact allowed the regulatory review exception calling it limited to the special
circumstances imposed by the need for government review, but also, in denying the "stockpil-
ing exception" went through a thorough interest analysis, only declaring the "stockpiling
exception" in violation of TRIPs on these facts.
283. See id.
284. Haag, supra note 263, at 954-60.
285. Id. The United States has also pressured some of its pharmaceutical companies to
provide lower priced pharmaceuticals to developing States in President Clinton's executive
order of May 10, 2000 and the Access to AIDS Treatment Act of 2001. Rosalyn S. Park, The
International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for South Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, 1
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 138, 152 (2002).
286. Haag, supra note 263, at 955 (quoting OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES' TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH (2002), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/doha-trips-graph6.PDF). Such a
concession by the United States seemingly undercuts the arguments that having Articles 30
and 31 bound by the non-discrimination clause of Article 27.1 will limit the ability of Member
States to provide for the individual circumstances of their countries because such an exception
as proposed by the United States directly addresses and counters the problems and concerns of
those detractors.
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production ability to manufacture the medicine for other developing
Members as well as helping to provide the medicine to those in need;
limiting the exception so as to strictly advantage the producers and users
of the technology evenly; and is conducive to social and economic wel-
fare of both those in need of medicines as well as the economic need of
the innovator states.87 If two Member States that have proven their dedi-
cation to adhering strictly to the text and meaning of TRIPs by filing
complaints to the DSB against what they considered discriminatory na-
tional patent laws agree to the need for and legitimacy of exceptions
even within the framework that Article 30 does not create an exception
to non-discrimination under Article 27.1, perhaps the Article 27.1 supe-
riority theory does not create some of the conflicts proposed."'8
Additionally, some countries who signed TRIPs have valid concerns
that other countries may discriminate against their products via field of
technology because other countries that strongly objected to including
such language in TRIPs or prior to TRIPs had systems that disallowed
patents in certain fields.8 9 If TRIPs is truly meant to be an international
agreement that harmonizes patent law at a minimum level of protection
then the non-discrimination clauses must not allow countries to have
exceptions for purely economic protectionist reasons. 290 It is easy to
imagine a situation where if the non-discrimination clause did not apply
to exceptions under Articles 30 and 31 that a state could use an exception
as a tool to better their economic well-being at the expense of another
State whether it be as to a certain technological field or across many lev-
els. The Panel echoed this concern in Canada-Generic Medicines in
explaining that if a broad reading of Article 30 were allowed, countries
could extend the discrimination beyond a possible valid use regarding
field of technology to discriminate against products that tended to be
made by foreign producers.29' Using such a discriminatory exception
may benefit the local social welfare of the State that uses the exception,
but a purpose of the TRIPs Agreement as provided for in its preamble is
"to reduce distortion and impediments to international trade, and taking
287. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7; see Cann, supra note 234, at 807.
288. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 386-91 (proposing that having Articles 30 and
31 within Article 27.1 is constraining on their purpose, which is to provide exceptions to
TRIPs). The United States applied for a Panel decision in the Brazil-Local Working Dispute
but later settled while the EC pursued their claim to a decision by the Panel in Canada-
Generic Medicines.
289. Negotiating Group W20, supra note 273, 1 31.
290. Kruger, supra note 31, at 202.
291. See Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 7.92-7.105. Presumably, dis-
crimination against place of invention or products that tended to be from foreign producers
that could fall under the Canadian exceptions would be invalid under the Article 27.1 guaran-
tee of non-discrimination as to place of invention or products imported or locally produced.
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into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights. ' 92 If the exceptions provisions are under-
stood to automatically rid a State of all obligations under the TRIPs
Agreement and are also given a broad reading so as to allow for their
frequent use, what point would the TRIPs Agreement have, especially if
its greatest achievement is establishing the first uniform minimum stan-
dards for intellectual property at the international level?
2 93
As earlier stated, an exception that meets the "limited exceptions"
test under Article 30 should also satisfy the non-discrimination standard
against fields of technology element.294 Article 30 is entitled Exceptions
to Rights Conferred and upon a quick review through Section 5, only
Article 28 uses the language "Rights Conferred"-which happens to be
the title of the Article.295 The similarities in the language in Articles 28
and 30 further link them together because Article 28.1 states "a patent
shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights" and Article 30
states "members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent" (emphasis added)296 Such strikingly similar lan-
guage about the conferring of exclusive patent rights is found no where
else within TRIPs.297
Additionally, Article 30 does not actually eliminate the availability
of patents, it just restricts their use in limited circumstances.! Article 28
does not confer availability or non-discrimination as an exclusive right
conferred by a patent, but simply lists the rights of a patent holder.299 Nor
does Article 27.1 establish non-discrimination as an exclusive right con-
ferred by the patent holder, but instead it lists the general non-
discrimination standard for the availability of patents and the enjoyabil-
ity of patent rights. 30 This non-discrimination standard is expressly
subjected to three articles within TRIPs so the question becomes, if Arti-
cle 27 were subject to the exceptions of Article 30, why did the authors
of this treaty not include Article 30 in this listing?'O Because the
non-discrimination standard is not an exclusive right, Article 30 cannot
limit non-discrimination because Article 30's text only allows it to pro-
292. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
293. TRIPs FAQs, supra note 19.
294. Canada--Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 7.92.
295. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 28, 30.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Weissman, supra note 169, at 1108-12.
299. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 28.
300. Id. art. 27.1.
301. - Id. Article 27.1 explicitly subjects the non-discrimination clause to "paragraph 4 of
Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article [Article 27]."
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vide exceptions to exclusive rights.0 2 The availability and enjoyability
are further connected together by a close textual analysis which shows
the "shall be" between "patents" and "available" in the non-
discrimination clause actually silently carries over because of the
conjunction "and" so as to make the text read: "patents shall be available
and patent rights [shall be] enjoyable without discrimination. ' 3° Perhaps
this was the negotiating parties attempt to ensure that the non-
discrimination standard applied before and after the awarding of a pat-
ent.3' An open concern of the parties while negotiating the treaty and
since its inception has been that States would use exceptions to patent
rights in a discriminatory manner.30 The WTO DSB has looked unfa-
vorably on suggestions that exceptions to non-discrimination rules can
be used for a discriminatory purpose.3" Article 27.1 TRIPs should not be
treated any differently than non-discrimination standards in other TRIPs
provisions or WTO Agreements. Therefore, Article 30 does not operate
within Article 27, but only within Article 28, and the non-discrimination
clause should apply.
30 7
302. Id. arts. 27, 30. See Weissman, supra note 169, at 1112. "Article 30 would not per-
mit a no-patent system. Even if such a system could be justified under the 'unreasonable
prejudice' clause, Article 30 only allows for exceptions 'to the exclusive rights conferred by a
patent,' meaning the patent itself must initially be granted." Id. In other words, Article 27 still
guarantees the availability of patents, even with the invocation of an Article 30 exception. See
id. This analysis follows because the text of Article 30 limits the provision from impacting the
availability and presumably the non-discrimination protection of Article 27.1. See id.
303. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27.1; Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 386.
304. Gervais, supra note 7. The non-discrimination clause did not appear in the TRIPs
negotiating history until the final proposed draft so the negotiating history does not address the
exact textual meaning. Negotiating Group W32r2, supra 269, at 106. Many parties raised
overriding concerns about the need for a non-discrimination standard in the final agreement.
The non-discrimination clause may be unique to the final TRIPs text, but a separate non-
discrimination requirement is mentioned in the negotiating history. Negotiating Group on
TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group on 11, 12, and 14 Dec. 1989, Jan. 23, 1990, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG1 lI/W/17 51 [hereinafter Negotiating Group W17]; Negotiating Group on
TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group on 30 Oct.-2 Nov. 1989, Dec. 4, 1989, GAIT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NGI I/W/16 9; Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group on
12-14 July 1989, Sept. 12, 1989, GATI Doc. MTN.GNG/NG1 l/W/14 51.
305. Negotiating Group W10, supra note 277, 11; see Canada-Generic Medicines,
supra note 13; see generally Negotiating Group W17, supra note 304; Negotiating Group
W16; Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Meeting of Negotiating Group on 11-13 Sept. 1989, Oct.
26, 1989, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGIl/W/15; Negotiating Group W14. The text truly ad-
dresses this concern because the parties were not just worried about the very availability of a
patent but also that exceptions such as compulsory licenses would be used in a discriminatory
way.
306. See supra Parts III, V, and VI C, regarding the application of national treatment and
most favoured nation status under TRIPs. Discrimination is a restriction on trade and generally
not permitted by the WTO.
307. See supra Parts III, IV, V, and VI.
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Another analysis that points to the inapplicability of Article 30 to Ar-
ticle 27.1 is the public international law maxim lex specialis derogat legi
generali "which provides in essence that where a general legal provision
conflicts with a specific legal provision, the specific legal provision gov-
erns."30 8 One can turn to this method because the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding allows for customary rules of public interna-
tional law to guide in the interpretation. 3°9 Some scholars argue under
this point that Article 27.1 is a general proposition and Articles 30 and
31 are specific propositions, so when in conflict with Article 27.1, Arti-
cles 30 and 31 control.3'0 For lex specialis to apply, however, both
provisions must pertain to the same subject matter.3 'Article 30, the spe-
cific provision, provides for exceptions to exclusive rights conferred,
while Article 27.1 applies to non-discrimination as to the enjoyability of
patent rights. Because the non-discrimination clause guarantees non-
discrimination and does not dictate what exclusive rights a patent con-
fers, Article 30 is not an exception to it and deals with different subject
matter.312 Therefore, lex specialis does not apply to the relationship be-
tween Articles 27.1 and 30.313 It appears that lex specialis applies to the
relationship between Articles 28 and 30, however, because Article 28
generally dictates what rights a patent confers its owner while Article 30
provides exceptions to the use of those rights.314
D. Avoiding the Problem All Together
Article 30 does not provide exceptions to Article 27.1, but this does
not mean that all is lost when making exceptions for certain products
that can treat health crises. This section addresses those concerns with
some reasonable alternatives that work within the treaty as it is currently
written. This section will address the certain product areas exception as
308. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 387.
309. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 3, in the Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 321, 334 (World Trade Organization, 1999).
310. Champ & Attaran, supra note 9, at 387.
311. See Otto Sandrock, "Handcuffs" Clauses in International Commercial Contracts:
Basic Reflections on the Autonomy of the Parties to Choose the Proper Law for Their Con-
tracts, 31 INT'L LAW. 1105, 1105-09. Sandrock explores whether lex specialis applies to the
situation when the general rule-a handcuffs clause which generally limits certain causes of
action, conflicts with a choice of law clause that picks a law that allows for a cause of action
the handcuffs clause denies. Both the handcuffs and choice of law clauses address one single
issue-which law applies to a cause of action.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 28, 30.
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discussed in Canada-Generic Medicines, the "circumvention method"
and the "security exception"3 5
As previously mentioned, "Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide ex-
ceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product
areas."'316 The limitation on exceptions "does not take away the rights of
a country to regulate a certain product; it just recognizes the unique need
of certain countries to regulate in a manner most beneficial to their coun-
try."3 '7 "It can be argued that an exception could be made for those
particular pharmaceuticals aimed at the prevention and treatment of HIV-
AIDS. The apparent distinction between a 'field of technology' and a
'certain product area' would justify the imposition of such an excep-
tion."31 Thus, by following the Canada-Generic Medicines standard, a
state can achieve its goal of providing pharmaceuticals to alleviate health
crises, so long as its exceptions to patent rights are directed at a certain
product or products." 9
The "circumvention method" allows a Member to avoid the conse-
quences of the non-discrimination clause by fitting a situation into the
public health exception found in Article 27.2.320 The first sentence in Ar-
ticle 27.1 grants the availability of patents and subjects said availability
to Articles 27.2 and 27.3.321 The second sentence of Article 27.1 ensures
non-discrimination as to the availability of patents. 2 If a Member State
qualifies for an exclusion to patentability under Article 27.2, the non-
discrimination clause would presumably not apply because there would
be no right to patentability in those circumstances. 23 Article 27.2 explic-
itly says that States can exclude from patentability, "inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which
is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect hu-
man, animal, or plant life or health.. .,,324 This language may move health
issues into the realm of public ordre and morality,325 creating an
315. Cann, supra note 234, at 822. Cann uses the term "security exception," while this
author uses the term "circumvention method."
316. Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13, 1 7.92 (emphasis added).
317. Kruger, supra note 31, at 201-02.
318. Cann, supra note 234, at 815.
319. See Canada-Generic Medicines, supra note 13 1 7.92; Can, supra note 234, at
815; Kruger, supra note 31, at 201-02.
320. Cann, supra note 234, at 811; Patrick L. Wojahn, A Conflict of Rights: Intellectual
Property Under TRIPS, the Right to Health, and AIDS Drugs, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR.
AFF. 463, 480 (2002).
321. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 27.1-27.3.
322. Id. arts. 27.1.
323. Id.
324. Id. art. 27.2.
325. Cann, supra note 234 at 811 (citing S.K. Verma, TRIPS and Plant Variety Protec-
tion in Developing Countries, 12 EUR. INTELL. PRoP. REv. 281, 281 (1995) who believes "the
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exception for public health that avoids the non-discrimination provision.
"As a result, Article 27.2 arguably permits a nation to deny patent protec-
tion to one or more pharmaceutical products if there is a legitimate
health reason to prevent their commercial exploitation within that na-
,,326tion.
A final exception, the "security exception" escapes the patents sec-
tion completely and moves to Article 73 of the TRIPs Agreement, which
states that nothing in the TRIPs Agreement prevents a Member from tak-
ing any action "which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests ... taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations. 3 27 This type of article is considered "universal"
and relieves a State from all substantive obligations under TRIPs.328
GATT Article XXI holds a comparable security exception, which has
been invoked to justify everything from restrictions for the protection of
the Swedish footwear industry, to the direct intervention of the affairs of
another State. 29 A health crisis can become a very destabilizing event
that can destroy social, economic, and political structures. AIDS pro-
vides an example of such a crisis, which both the UN Security Council
and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has labeled as security threats.
331 Through the Article 73 security exception, both developing and devel-
oped countries could produce generic medicines for those States whose
health crises have created a security threat for their own country.
332
VII. CONCLUSION
The actual theory and reasons behind the enactment of the TRIPs
Agreement are controversial and the ambiguous nature of the treaty
compounds this conflict. The case studies explored in this Note illustrate
the balancing acts and high theory that comprise every dispute on this
subject and the never ending nature of social welfare debates. Under-
standably, because all the parties to the TRIPs Agreement held very
different interests, the language of the treaty had to be ambiguous and
open to many interpretations so as to please all the parties involved.
use of such language ... transforms health-related concerns into 'moral and public order is-
sues' ... and thus incorporates 'overriding social, ethical, and moral considerations' into the
'patent regime' ").
326. Cann, supra note 234, at 811; see also Wojahn, supra note 320, at 479-80.
327. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 73(b)(iii); Cann, supra note 234, at 822.
328. Cann, supra note 234, at 822 (quoting JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT 537-38 (1969)).
329. Id. at 823-25.
330. Id. at 827.
331. Id. at 828, 830.
332. Id. at 832.
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The importance of the TRIPs Agreement should not be discounted-
it is the first time that the international community was able to decide on
uniform minimum standards for intellectual property rights and a judi-
cial enforcement mechanism for those standards. Therefore, when
approaching problems that arise within TRIPs, Member States must
honor the text and purposes of the agreement. In doing so, any interpre-
tation of the text when dealing with the problem should begin with an
analysis of the text to see how the problem fits into the agreement and it
should not begin with looking at the problem and seeing how to make
the treaty conform to it.
Such an analysis leads to this Note's conclusion-TRIPs Section 5
Article 27.1 is the foundation and guiding principle of the patents sec-
tion. Within Section 5, Article 27.1 is only subject to the provisions
expressly listed by Article 27 as a whole. The desire to prevent non-
discrimination against patents due to place of invention, field of technol-
ogy, and whether imported or locally produced was a driving force
behind the development of a uniform patent system because many Mem-
ber States were not respecting the patent rights of companies from other
States and this was becoming a barrier to the furtherance of international
trade. In providing exceptions to the exclusive rights granted to a patent
owner under Article 28, it is dubious that many of the Member States
who signed TRIPs would have agreed that such exceptions can be im-
plemented in a discriminatory manner because this would in effect
negate the very purpose of TRIPs, especially if the exceptions are ever
given as broad of a scope as advocated by some commentators.
AIDS and other medical crises that have inspired so many to com-
ment on TRIPs are truly global tragedies and all Member States of the
WTO should help their fellow Members solve these dilemmas. But in
solving medical crises problems, the answer is not to throw away the
bargained for provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. The TRIPs Agreement
already provides a perfectly plausible framework within its text to
achieve global social policy goals and protection of IPRs. This frame-
work is found in the interaction between Articles 27, 28, 30, 31 as
supplemented by Articles 7,8, and 73.
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